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The explanatory power of earnings per share (eps) is on the decline as firms are focusing more 
on intangible assets and are disclosing more marketing metrics when they announce their 
earnings (e.g., subscribers for the telecom & media industry and monthly active users for social 
media industry). However, the performance of these marketing output metrics beyond 
market/analysts’ expectations (i.e., surprises) requires marketing resources, which may reduce 
current profitability but may also signal a higher future cash flow. Therefore, building on 
information economics, we assess if there is information content in marketing metric surprises, 
and how the stock market reacts to such surprises. Further, we argue that the information content 
of marketing metric surprises varies under different information signals by firms (strategic 
emphasis) and screening cues by investors (marketing expenditure). We also investigate the 
temporal variations in the effect of marketing metric surprises and also examine the relative 
importance of marketing metric surprises as compared to earnings surprises across multiple 
industries. We test the claims using an event study methodology around earnings announcement 
on S&P 1500 firms consisting of firms disclosing industry-specific marketing metrics and non-
disclosing firms. We account for sample selection bias and correcting for potential endogeneity 
concerns of surprises marketing metrics. Our findings suggest that (1) although an increase in 
marketing metric surprise affects the stock market returns positively, (2) this effect is 
strengthened when firms signal strategic emphasis on value appropriation relative to value 
creation whereas (3) it is attenuated when investors screen for firms with higher unanticipated 
marketing expenditure, (4) the effect of marketing metric surprises increases over time whereas it 
decreases for earnings surprise, and (5) the effect of marketing metric surprise is higher in the 
telecom and media industry as compared to earnings surprises. The study helps to improve 
marketing accountability at the time of earnings announcement by improving the overall 
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 Quarterly earnings announcements are important events in firms’ lifecycle, wherein firms 
disclose information about their quarterly earnings, and investors update their beliefs about 
firms’ overall financial health. Traditionally, investors have focused mainly on the financial 
information chiefly earnings per share (eps) at the earnings announcement. The stock market 
rewards firms that meet or beat the market expectations of eps (Bartov et al. 2002) i.e., investors 
react to a new information (good news in this case) in eps. However, the explanatory power of 
eps has been declining as firms are focusing on and building more intangible assets (Francis and 
Schipper 1999), which are not visible in earnings outcomes. Moreover, it is known that 
marketing is particularly important in building intangible assets of firms through branding, 
customer relationships, etc. (Srivastava et al. 1998). Therefore, a pertinent question arises: what 
is the role of the marketing in the assessment of overall earnings quality of the firm? In this 
study, we attempt to answer this question by evaluating the performance of marketing output 
metrics beyond market/analysts’ expectations (marketing metric surprises) at the time of 
earnings announcement. 
Existing studies on stock returns to marketing output metrics either use subjective 
marketing metrics (e.g., customer satisfaction and customer-based brand equity) that are not 
disclosed by the focal firm at earnings announcement or objective marketing metrics only that 
are limited to only a few industries (e.g., number of subscribers for media industry). Further, the 
stock market reacts only to the new information or unexpected performances (surprises) in firms’ 
performances and existing marketing studies use autoregressive models to predict these 
unexpected performances (Mizik and Jacobson 2008) ignoring analysts’ expectations of the 
model. However, financial analysts are better forecasters than autoregressive models because 
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they have superior and timely information compared to quantitative models (Fried and Givoly 
1982). In fact, in their review article of marketing and firm value, Srinivasan and Hanssens 
(p.308, 2009) raise the question “How do analysts’ interpretations of marketing activities, such 
as product-price changes, affect stock returns?”. Therefore, in this study, we focus on the stock 
market returns on objective marketing output metrics across different industries that are disclosed 
by focal firms when they announce their earnings. Further, the forecasts on these marketing 
metrics are done by financial analysts. For example, some of the marketing metrics that we use 
in this study are the number of subscribers in the media and telecom industry, monthly active 
users in social media, similar store sales growth in retail, and the number of deposits in the 
banking services. Once firms disclose such marketing metrics, they may positively (negatively) 
surprise the market expectations on these marketing metrics i.e., exceed (or fall short of) 
financial analysts' forecasts. However, surprises in marketing metrics require higher marketing 
resources that may negatively impact the current profitability or stock returns, and at the same 
time, may bring a higher current and future cash flow due to more intangible assets. Therefore, 
building on information economics, we assess the information content in marketing metrics 
surprises beyond the effect of financial metric surprises (e.g., eps) at the time of earnings 
announcements. 
 Further, the information content of the marketing metric surprise could vary in different 
information environments, may vary over time, and, the relative information content of 
marketing metric surprise may be different from the eps surprise. Therefore, we should test for 
such boundary conditions. First, our moderators are drawn from the literature on information 
asymmetry where firms (agents) use a signaling strategy whereas investors (principals) use 
screening strategy to reduce any asymmetry around the new information of marketing metric 
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surprises. Specifically, firms signal their marketing resource allocation through their strategic 
emphasis, i.e., emphasis on value appropriation relative to value creation. The signaling of 
strategic emphasis is important in communicating to the stock market the likelihood the firms 
can achieving and stabilizing the future cash flow generated by information content (surprises) in 
marketing metrics. On the other hand, investors, who are the less informed players in the market, 
may screen firms indulging in unanticipated expenses in marketing to assess the information 
content of marketing metrics. Second, finance and accounting researchers have emphasized that 
the effect of earnings surprise has been decreasing over time (Francis and Schipper 1999), so a 
key question emerges that is the declining effect of eps surprises now being captured in 
marketing metric surprises? Finally, the relative information content in marketing metric 
surprises as compared to eps surprises may be different based on different industries in which 
firms operate. Overall, our research objectives are as below: 
1. Information content of marketing metric surprises: How does the stock market react to the 
information content in marketing metric surprise at the time of earnings announcement? 
2. Moderating effect of information asymmetry: How is the relationship between marketing 
metric surprises and stock market returns moderated by: (i) firms’ signal of strategic emphasis, 
and (ii) investors’ screening cues of unanticipated marketing expenses? 
3. Time-varying effect of marketing metric surprises: What is the effect of marketing metric and 
earning surprise over time? 
4. Relative effect of marketing metric surprises: What is the relative effect of marketing metric 
surprises over earning surprise in different industries? 
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 To test the conceptual framework, we use S&P 1500 firms from multiple industries 
voluntarily disclosing their key industry-specific marketing metrics at the time of quarterly 
earnings. We use an event study methodology at the time of the earnings announcement to 
investigate stock market reactions to surprises in marketing metrics. Recognizing that not all 
firms voluntarily disclose their industry-specific marketing metrics, we correct for the same 
using Heckman correction. Further, similar to earnings management, where firms strategically 
try to surprise the stock market positively (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997), firms may strategically 
choose to surprise the stock market with respect to marketing metrics also. Therefore, we correct 
for the potential endogeneity of marketing metrics surprises using the control function approach 
(Petrin and Train 2010). 
 Our results shed light on the role of marketing metric surprises and how the stock market 
reacts to this information. First, our main effect result indicates that the stock market reacts 
positively to marketing metrics surprises at the time of earnings announcement as they are an 
indicator of a higher future cash flow and also attract higher investors’ attention. Second, our 
moderating effect results suggest that the effect of marketing metric surprises vary under 
information asymmetry. Specifically, the positive effect of marketing metrics surprise 
deteriorates when firms signal their strategic emphasis on value appropriation compared to value 
creation because of a firm’s ability to mitigate risks in the cash flow generated by marketing 
metric surprises due to superior brand and customer assets. Further, the positive effect of 
marketing metrics surprise deteriorates when investors screen unexpected increases in marketing 
expenditure mainly due to lower marketing capability of firms in extracting future cash flow 
from marketing metric surprises. Third, the time-varying effect of marketing metric surprise 
shows that the effect of marketing metric surprise on stock returns increases with time whereas 
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the effect of earnings surprise decreases with time. Finally, the industry-specific relative 
information content results indicate that on average the effect of marketing metric surprise is 
lower than earnings surprise across industries except for the media and telecom industry where 
the effect of marketing metric surprise is higher than earnings surprise. 
 The study makes several contributions to the marketing-finance interface. First, the 
research introduces the idea of marketing metric surprises at the time of earnings announcement 
and its relevance to the stock market and thereby advancing the accountability of marketing in 
the boardrooms. Second, the study contributes to the resource-based view (RBV) and 
information asymmetry literature where signaling strategic emphasis on value appropriation  
relative to value creation and screening about the excessive expenditure of marketing resources 
impact the value in information content of the marketing metric surprises, i.e., its effect on stock 
returns. Third, to the literature on market-based assets, the study finds that the effects of 
marketing metric surprises are increasing over time as firms invest in building higher intangible 
assets that are captured through these marketing performances. Finally, the findings of this study 
would help marketing managers and Chief Marketing Officers in establishing the role of the 
marketing through the value relevance of marketing metrics reported at the time of earnings 
announcement. 
 The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner. The next section discusses the 
research background and motivation, followed by the conceptual framework. Then, we discuss 
the data and measures used in this study, followed by the methodology. Next, we discuss the 




In the last two decades, since the seminal paper by Srivastava et al. (1998), substantial 
work has been done in the area of marketing-finance interface highlighting the role of marketers 
in creating values for shareholders (Edeling and Fischer 2016). Much of the work emphasizes on 
how various subjective marketing metrics such as customer satisfaction (Anderson et al. 2004), 
product quality (Tellis and Johnson 2007), brand equity (Mizik and Jacobson 2008), word- of -
mouth (Tirunillai and Tellis 2012), customer equity (Kumar and Shah 2009) help in creating firm 
value. Another stream of literature focuses of various how objective marketing metrics - 
advertising expense (Joshi and Hanssens 2010), marketing expenditure (Kim and McAlister 
2011), and objective marketing outcome metrics such as number of subscribers (McCarthy et al. 
2017), similar store sales growth (Tuli et al. 2012), affect the stock market response at the time 
of earnings announcement. This study falls under the stream of the latter area. 
The current study deviates from existing literature in four important ways. First, from the 
literature that uses subjective marketing metrics as these metrics are not announced at the 
quarterly earnings announcement and are reported by third parties. For instance, customer 
satisfaction by the American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) and brand equity by various 
third parties – Interbrand, Young and Rubicam, and Brand Finance, to name a few. However, 
subjective marketing metrics have different measurements by different third parties and are 
difficult in assessment by investors (Seggie et al. 2007). Second, the existing studies in assessing 
the role of objective marketing metrics in affecting firm value are limited to a few firms and only 
in certain industries where customer-based valuation is possible. For example, McCarthy et al. 
(2017) study the effect of the number of subscribers in the media industry for two firms, Tuli et 
al. (2012) studies the role of similar store sales growth for the retail industry. Third, the objective 
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marketing action metrics such as advertising and marketing expenditure tells only half of the 
story, and it is important for investors to assess the outcomes of such marketing actions rather 
than just assessing the inputs (Katsikeas et al. 2016). Finally, as the stock market reacts only to 
the new information in metrics, the information content in subjective and objective marketing 
metrics considered in the existing literature only uses time series models to measure the 
unanticipated changes in those metrics. However, finance and accounting literature has 
emphasized the role and superiority of financial analysts in predicting unanticipated changes for 
different performance measures. They find that models that use financial analysts forecasts for 
unanticipated changes perform better than time series model as analysts have timely, and a larger 
set of information and more timely information to forecast the metrics compared to the time 
series models (Brown et al. 1987). Therefore, in this study, we study the stock market returns to 
objective marketing outcome metrics across different industries where financial analysts 
determine the new information in marketing metrics. Table 1 lists select studies in assessing the 
stock returns to marketing metrics and the contribution of this study. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Industry-Specific marketing metrics 
Every industry has its own marketing output metric that is relevant to the stock market. 
Table 2 presents all the industry-specific marketing metrics used in this study. The compilation 
of industry-specific marketing metrics is based mainly on existing literature. In case where an 
industry discloses more than one marketing metrics then we choose the marketing metrics that 
has on average the greatest number of analysts following. For media and telecommunication 
industry, investors consider number of subscribers as the key marketing metric. Several 
marketing studies studying customer-based valuation of firms use the number of subscribers as 
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the basis for their studies (Gupta et al. 2004; McCarthy et al. 2017). Further, as one goes from 
the media and telecommunication industry to the social media industry, the number of 
subscribers or users in not a value relevant marketing metric for this industry. Instead, the stock 
market is interested in how many users are actively engaged with the firm and hence Monthly 
Active Users (MAU) is the most relevant marketing metric for these industries (CNBC 2018). 
Further, as one moves from these high-tech industries to more traditional industry such as Retail 
industry, the relevant marketing metrics for them is similar store sales growth indicating 
customer loyalty for these retailers (Tuli et al. 2012). Overall, the value relevance of industry-
specific marketing metrics in Table 2 is either drawn from existing literature or from the number 
of analysts following on these marketing metrics. In an industry, if more than one marketing 
metric is value relevant, then, we choose the marketing metrics where the number of analysts 
following is the highest (Barth et al. 2001). 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Building on Information economics, the information content in any metric should have 
two important characteristics (a) value relevance, and (b) credibility (Healy and Palepu 2001). 
Next, we discuss both value relevance and credibility of the aforementioned objective marketing 
metrics and shed some light on the role of financial analysts for such marketing metrics. 
Value Relevance of marketing metric at the earnings announcement 
The discounted cash flow of firm valuation has two factors: future cash flow and discount 
rate (weighted cost of capital). Both these factors are relevant to investors. Future cash flow is 
important to shareholders as it indicates a firm’s ability to reinvest in projects, return money to 
shareholders, and liquidate the assets (Vuolteenaho 2002). Further, a lower cost of capital is 
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important for equity investors and debt holders as it indicates a higher net present value of future 
cash flow (Kothari 2001). Marketing metrics affects both these components of the discounted 
cash flow model and thus, is relevant to investors. First, marketing metrics are forward-looking 
in nature and are indicative of a higher future cash flow (Gruca and Rego 2005; Srivastava et al. 
1998). The disclosure of marketing metrics at the time of earnings announcement reduces 
information asymmetry about future cash flow between the managers and investors (Healy and 
Palepu 2001). Indeed, Dechow et al. (2010) show that non-financials such as marketing metrics 
improve the overall earnings quality of firms. Second, marketing metrics are also important in 
reducing the cost of capital of firms. In fact, higher marketing outcome metrics are a result of 
higher intangible assets such as customer satisfaction, brand equity, and corporate reputation, 
and these assets influence the cost of capital (Himme and Fischer 2014). A variety of customer 
and brand assets affect loyalty, willingness to pay, among others, further improving marketing 
outcomes, and thus investors perceive lesser risk because of higher marketing outcomes of firms.  
The Credibility of marketing metrics 
The disclosure of marketing metrics are voluntary decisions, and therefore, investors may 
raise a concern about the credibility of these metrics. In this study, we argue that the voluntarily 
disclosed marketing outcome metrics are credible in two important ways. First, unlike subjective 
marketing metrics such as customer satisfaction, brand equity, etc., these marketing metrics are 
objective in nature and disclosed by firms and therefore are subject to verification. Second, false 
reporting of such metrics is associated with huge reputational and litigation costs (Gigler 1994), 
and thus in general, firms do not indulge in such practices. For instance, Wells Fargo was 
involved in a scandal in late 2016 when it reported false marketing metrics by creating millions 
of fraudulent customer deposits (accounts). Wells Fargo was fined $185 million for this illegal 
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activity and by the end of 2018 had to pay $2.7 billion because of various civil and criminal 
lawsuits. Indeed, in a setting where managers voluntarily disclose the information, Stocken 
(2000) finds that managers almost always disclose the voluntary information truthfully to build 
their reputation. 
Information Intermediaries and marketing metrics 
 Information intermediaries or financial (sell-side) analysts are important constituents of 
the capital market in the efficient flow of information from firms to investors and generate 
information for the market (Healy and Palepu 2001). Primarily, analysts offer stock 
recommendations, make forecasts about a firm’s financials, in particular, the estimates on 
earnings per share. The market expectation of eps is the average eps estimates from all the 
analysts covering a particular firm. Similarly, when a firm discloses marketing output metrics at 
the time of earnings announcements, various analysts make forecasts about these marketing 
metrics also.1 The consensus estimates of financial analysts are considered important by 
investors, as they are more accurate, and their predictions explain the stock return better than the 
time-series models of earnings (Brown et al. 1987; Kothari 2001). The analyst consensus 
estimates are better than time series model estimates because analysts use a variety of accurate, 
and timely information for their forecasts (Brown et al. 1987). Therefore, unlike past studies that 
focus on time series trends of marketing metrics to measure surprise/unexpected/unanticipated 
performance (Mizik 2010; Mizik and Jacobson 2008), we use analysts’ forecasts of marketing 
metric to measure marketing metric surprise. 
 
 
1 It should be noted that the number of analysts following for a particular marketing metric forecast is much lower 
than eps forecast as eps has been the traditional focus of analysts and investors. However, as there is higher focus on 




Information content of marketing metric surprises 
 As discussed earlier, marketing outcome metrics are value relevant and the information 
about these metrics are credible to investors. However, the stock market reacts only to the new 
information in the marketing metrics. Therefore, it is important to consider stock market 
reactions to marketing metric surprise instead of the level values of marketing metrics. 
Marketing metric surprise refers to the unexpected change in the actual marketing metric with 
respect to the expected marketing metric. In Figure 1, we present the conceptual framework of 
our study where we hypothesize the effect of marketing metric surprise on the stock market 
returns contingent upon firms’ resource allocation signals and investors’ screening of 
unanticipated marketing expenditure. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 In general, marketing output metrics are associated with future cash flows (Srivastava et 
al. 1998). Increase in surprise in marketing output metrics are results of superiority in customer 
mindset metrics such as customer-based brand equity, customer satisfaction, etc. and these 
metrics are known to influence firm value (Anderson et al. 2004; Mizik and Jacobson 2008). 
Surprise in marketing metrics also indicates that firms would be able to extract higher values in 
the future from existing customer relationships (Kumar and Shah 2009), make use of brand as 
assets to appropriate higher values from customers (Edeling and Fischer 2016). In this case, the 
customer mindset metrics would affect stock market returns through marketing output metrics. 
Further, the signaling theory suggests the good news or unanticipated increase in marketing 
output metrics signals investors to revise their expectations to higher future cash flow 
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(Srinivasan and Hanssens 2009). Finally, the investor attention hypothesis suggests that the good 
news in marketing metrics attract investor attention (Barber and Odean 2007; Xiong and 
Bharadwaj 2013), which influences the stock returns. Indeed, Lou (2014) finds that marketing 
resources, such as product market advertising, that impacts marketing metrics, has a spillover 
effect in grabbing the attention of investors and thus stock returns. A higher number of investors 
in the focal firm that surprise the market on marketing metrics help in spreading risks across 
these investors and the cost of capital decreases and hence increasing the stock returns. 
Therefore: 




Drawing on the literature on information economics, we argue that there is an 
information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. Two solutions of information 
asymmetry have been suggested in the literature – signaling and screening (Löfgren et al. 2002). 
Building on the solution to information asymmetry, we argue that the information content in 
marketing metric surprise at the time of earnings announcement may vary based on the 
information provided by managers. The surprises in marketing metrics are a result of marketing 
efforts and resources, and therefore, managers signaling of and investors' screening of such 
marketing resource allocation may moderate the relationship between marketing metric surprises 
and stock returns.  
Specifically, marketing resource allocations between value appropriation efforts and 
creation efforts is referred to as a firm’s strategic emphasis, signals investors how values (profits) 
are extracted from a firm's customers (Mizik and Jacobson 2003). For instance, Netflix (a media 
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company) can allocate resources to create value by producing original content or it can spend 
resources in advertising to acquire more customers or extract higher values from existing 
customers. Therefore, the information content in marketing metric surprises may vary under the 
information signals about a firm's strategic emphasis. Further, investors may also screen a focal 
firm due to excessive utilization of marketing resources. The information content in marketing 
metric surprises may vary under unanticipated higher or lower marketing spending.  
Moderating effect of signaling (strategic emphasis). Strategic emphasis refers to the relative 
emphasis on value appropriation compared to value creation strategy of firms. Firms signal both 
these essential strategies to the stock market, and each creates firm value in a unique way (Mizik 
and Jacobson 2003). The value creation strategy focuses on generating new sources of revenue 
through activities such as developing new products/services for customers. Similarly, value 
appropriation strategy focuses on extracting higher profits from existing customers by building 
brand assets (Edeling and Fischer 2016; Mizik and Jacobson 2003). In this context, strategic 
emphasis signals how firms utilize their resources through value creation and appropriation in 
fulfilling their future cash flow ability generated by marketing metric surprises. The relative 
emphasis on value appropriation compared to value creation helps in increasing stock returns 
(Frennea et al. 2019; Mizik and Jacobson 2003) and as well as reducing systematic risks (Han et 
al. 2017).  
The future cash flow generated through marketing metrics surprise can potentially be 
achieved by both the value creation and value appropriation strategies. Value creation can 
develop new products/services for their existing customers and stabilize the cash flow created 
from marketing metrics surprises. Further, value appropriation strategies can help firms build 
competitive barriers by building brand assets, extract profit from existing relationships, and help 
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achieve the cash flow stability in the future. Marketing literature has credited value appropriation 
strategies as more cash stabilized strategies as they are important in mitigating both systematic 
and any idiosyncratic risks (Han et al. 2017). However, it is not certain which strategy would 
signal as more relevant to shareholders when assessing the information content of marketing 
metric surprises. Therefore, 
H2: Strategic emphasis on value appropriation relative to value creation negatively 
moderates the relationship between marketing metric surprise and stock market returns. 
H2ALT: Strategic emphasis on value appropriation relative to value creation positively 
moderates the relationship between marketing metric surprise and stock market returns 
 
Moderating effect of screening (unexpected changes in marketing expenditure). Marketing 
investments are important indicators of the financial health of firms and also an important signal 
for investors for the firm's future growth. Unexpected changes in marketing expenditure refer to 
an unanticipated increase or decrease in marketing expenditure compared to the forecast. 
Advertising expenditure, which is an important component of the overall marketing expenditure, 
has gained a lot of attention in the marketing literature and its importance has been shown to 
increase firm value (Joshi and Hanssens 2010) and reduce systematic risks (McAlister et al. 
2007). Further, marketing expenditure that includes components other than advertising such as 
salesforce expense, administrative expenses, etc. are also considered important for the investors 
(Kim and McAlister 2011; Kurt and Hulland 2013) which is important for a variety of  
industries’ marketing metrics. However, consistent with finance and accounting literature, Kim 
and McAlister (2011) find that unexpected marketing expenditure negatively affects the stock 
market returns.  
We argue that an unexpected increase in marketing expenditure would indicate lower 
cash flow stability in the future, mainly due to the marketing capability of firms. Firms that 
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surprise the stock market on marketing metrics signal their investors about the stability of future 
cash flow generated by such surprises, as they require larger than expected marketing resources. 
Firms with superior marketing capabilities can generate higher output metrics using limited 
marketing resources (Dutta et al. 1999; Saboo et al. 2017). Firms that are more efficient in 
marketing learn about customers’ future needs and create products/services accordingly to 
generate a stable cash flow (Vorhies et al. 2009). Therefore: 
H3: Unanticipated marketing expense negatively moderates the relationship between 
marketing metric surprise and stock market returns. 
Time-varying effect 
Time-varying effect of earnings vs. marketing metric surprises. The earnings and marketing 
metrics are disclosed by firms in their financial reports every quarter. Investors update their 
beliefs about the value relevance in surprises of both financial and marketing metrics through 
various learning mechanisms. Many companies are investing resources in building their 
intangible assets such as brands, customer equity, etc., which might not be reflected completely 
in the financial statements. In fact, accounting researchers find that financial statements may be 
losing its relevance in the stock market over time. Specifically, the explanatory power of 
earnings has been declining at the rate of 0.4% per year in the last four decades (Francis and 
Schipper 1999) and the earnings response coefficient is also declining over time (Lev and 
Zarowin 1999).  
The part of earnings that is not being explained are mainly captured in the intangible 
assets as reflected through the marketing output metrics (Amir and Lev 1996; Goodwin and 
Ahmed 2006). We argue that as companies disclose their marketing outcome metrics and hence, 
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the marketing metric surprises information, the stock market learns more about a firm’s growth 
prospective through the forward-looking marketing metrics that are not captured in the 
backward-looking financial earnings. Therefore,   
H4: The effect of marketing metric surprises affecting stock returns increases over time 
whereas the effect of earnings surprise decreases over time.  
Data and Sample 
We test the conceptual framework using data from S&P 1500 firms consisting of firms 
disclosing industry-specific marketing metrics and non-disclosing firms. S&P 1500 accounts for 
around 90% market capitalization of all US stocks. To understand the effect of marketing metric 
surprises on stock market returns, we would need consensus analysts’ estimates of marketing 
metrics. Due to the wide use of financial metrics, analysts’ consensus eps estimate data is easily 
available through Institutional Broker Estimates System (IBES). However, the same is not true 
for marketing metrics as IBES KPI data, which contains analysts’ forecasts on marketing 
metrics, is sparsely populated. One other source of data on analysts’ marketing metrics 
consensus estimates, Factset Estimates on Demand database, is well populated and therefore, is 
used in this study. The data on stock market returns are collected from The Center for Research 
in Security Prices (CRSP) database, and the data on other firm-specific control variables are 
collected from the COMPUSTAT database. The final compiled data is from 402 S&P 1500 firms 
that disclose key industry-specific marketing metrics and the panel data has around 11009 firm-




Independent Variable. Marketing metric surprise measures the unexpected performance of firms 
on marketing metrics. We measure it as the ratio of difference between actual and analysts’ 
consensus estimate to that of analysts’ consensus estimate. The unexpected performance in 
marketing metrics and eps can also be measured using time series models (Fried and Givoly 
1982; Mizik 2010). The difference between the actual marketing metric at the time of earnings 
announcement and the predicted value by the time series model is the unexpected performance in 
marketing metrics. However, consensus analyst estimates are better forecasters compared to 
time-series models because they have more timely and accurate information about the firm’s 
performances (Kothari 2001). The average marketing metric surprise is 3.6% and on average 
55.4% times positive marketing metric surprises occur.  
Dependent Variable. In line with the existing literature to capture the information content of 
marketing metric or eps surprises at the time of earnings announcement, we use the stock 
abnormal return around the event (Bartov et al. 2002; Srinivasan and Hanssens 2009). The 
abnormal stock return at the time of earnings announcement is the equity value beyond the 
expected returns using Fama-French three factor model (Fama and French 1993) including the 
momentum factor (Carhart 1997).The abnormal return over a period of time around the earnings 
announcement is cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). We write the combine four-factor model 
as below: 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = (𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) − [𝛼𝑖 + 𝜋1𝑖(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝜋2𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝜋3𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜋4𝑖𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡
+ 𝑖𝑡] 
(1) 
where; ARit is the abnormal return, Rit is returns for firm i at time t, Rft is risk-free rate, Rmt is the 
average market returns, SMBt is returns on portfolio of small stocks minus large stocks, HMLt is 
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returns on portfolio of high book-to-market ratio stocks minus low book-to-market, UMDt is 
Carhart’s price momentum factor, and 𝑖𝑡 is disturbance term such that E[ 𝑖𝑡]=0.  
Figure 2 panel A displays both average marketing metric and average earnings surprise 
across different years showing adequate variance in both these variables across years. Further, it 
also shows both earnings surprise and marketing metric surprise do not move in the same 
direction across different quarters and is also evident from the binary correlation between the two 
variables (ρEPSSUR,MMSUR = 0.024). Figure 2 panel B displays model free evidence showing 
average abnormal positive/negative returns for industry-specific positive/negative marketing 
metric surprises, and the number of for different marketing metrics. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Moderating Variables 
Unexpected marketing expenditure. We use the difference between selling, general, and 
administrative expense (SG&A) and research and development (R&D) expense as the total 
marketing expenditure of firms. Using univariate time-series trends (Mizik 2010), we estimate 
unexpected expense in marketing expenditure as difference between actual marketing expense 
and predicted marketing expenditure from the time series model as below: 
 𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖 + ∑ 𝑄𝑡𝑟𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 (2) 
 Where, MktExp is the marketing expenditure of firm i in quarter t. We also use industry 
and quarter fixed effects in the model. However, using an autoregressive model where the lagged 
variable is as independent variable create a dynamic panel bias. To correct for the same, we use 
the lagged difference in the dependent variable as the instrument, estimate the regression of 
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𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 on ∆𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡−1, and use the predicted value as the instrument (Blundell and Bond 
1998).  
Strategic emphasis. Following existing literature in Marketing (Han et al. 2017; Mizik and 
Jacobson 2003), we use the ratio of difference in advertising expenses (value appropriation) and 
R&D expenses (value creation) to total assets as relative baseline strategic emphasis of firms.2 
Similar to Equation 2, our measure of strategic emphasis is unexpected changes in the baseline 
strategic emphasis (Mizik and Jacobson 2003). A higher value of strategic emphasis indicates a 
firm’s higher focus on value appropriation relative to value creation whereas a lower strategic 
emphasis refers to higher focus on value creation relative to value appropriation. 
Control Variables 
We use an extensive set of metric, firm and industry level control variable that may affect 
a firm’s stock returns at the time of earnings announcement. Specifically, we include earnings 
surprise (Bartov et al. 2002), sales surprise (Jegadeesh and Livnat 2006), and stock 
recommendations (Altınkılıç and Hansen 2009) that would affect a firm’s stock returns due to 
information content about future profitability in these variables. Further, we include the number 
of analyst following to account for the availability of information and reputation of firms 
(Diether et al. 2002). We also include total assets, market value to account for the size firms 
(Fama and French 1995). Finally, we include industry level controls such as competitive 
intensity to account for the level of competition and growth opportunities for firms (Hou and 
 
 
2 Given that Compustat data has missing values for advertising and marketing expenditure, we follow (Malshe and 
Agarwal 2015) to impute these missing values. Specifically, we use ratio of advertising to SG&A for each industry 
and take the quarterly average. Finally, to impute missing values of advertising expense, we multiply the calculated 
industry- quarterly advertising to SG&A ratio average with the SG&A expense to get the missing advertising 
expense. We follow similar process for missing R&D expenditure.  
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Robinson 2006). We present the operationalization of the independent, dependent, moderating, 
and other control variables in Table 3. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Methodology 
 To test hypotheses H1 through H3, we use an event study methodology where we estimate 
the effect of marketing metric surprise on cumulative stock returns at the time of the quarterly 
earnings announcement. Our sample of firms has repeated observations over different quarters, 
and we utilize panel-data methods to answer our research questions. However, our model suffers 
from two major challenges – sample selection bias of voluntary disclosure of marketing metrics 
and potential endogeneity of our focal variable marketing metric surprises. We next discuss these 
two issues and use two auxiliary regression estimations and incorporate them the main model 
(Equation 4). 
Sample Selection  
 
Our final sample of 402 firms disclosing their marketing metrics at the time of earnings 
announcement out of S&P 1500 firms suggests that managers are strategic in their disclosure 
behavior (Verrecchia 1983).3 Therefore, we correct for this sample selection bias using a two-
step Heckman correction (Heckman 1979) where we estimate a probit model in the first stage 
and take the inverse mill ratio (IMR) in the main model (Equation 4). Finance and accounting 
literature suggest a variety of reasons for a firm’s higher information disclosure behavior. For 
 
 
3 Firms are highly sticky in their disclosure behavior i.e., once majority of firms start disclosing their marketing 
metrics, they do not revert their decisions. Consistent with prior literature in marketing (Bayer et al. 2017; DeKinder 
and Kohli 2008), in our sample just 2.1% of firms have stopped disclosing their previously disclosed primary 
marketing metrics. We remove such firms for our analysis. 
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instance, factors such as institutional ownership, ownership concentration, marketing intensity, 
market value, among others are some of the known reasons for a higher information disclosure to 
mitigate any information asymmetry between managers and shareholders (Healy and Palepu 
2001; Verrecchia 2001). However, our focus is to identify reasons to disclose primary industry 
specific marketing metrics.  
Drawing on the literature on market orientation, we argue that firms that are more market 
oriented would make use of industry-specific marketing metrics to assess their performance 
(Ambler et al. 2004) and would also disseminate the same to their shareholders. Therefore, we 
use a firm’s market orientation as a primary reason to disclose its marketing metrics. Following 
related literature, we measure a firm’s market orientation as the ratio of the total number of 
words related to a firm’s market orientation to the total words in their 10-Ks (Noble et al. 2002; 
Saboo and Grewal 2013). Moreover, a firm’s market orientation is not new information to the 
stock market. The market reacts only to new information in the stock market. Therefore, a firm’s 
market orientation would not affect abnormal returns at the time of earnings announcement 
satisfying the exclusion restriction of Heckman correction. In Table 1A of Appendix A, we 
describe the words used to measure market orientation of firms. Further, we also use disclosure 
prevalence in the industry as an additional exclusion variable where we argue that there are 
certain industries where disclosure of marketing metrics is prevalent because of which focal 
firms are likely to disclose their marketing metrics. Moreover, as the industry is a large entity it 
does not impact a focal firm’s stock returns and therefore, disclosure prevalence also satisfies 
both the relevancy and exclusion criteria. Formally, we present the first stage probit model as 




Pr(𝑀𝑀_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝛷(∆
′𝑍𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 +
𝛼2𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜗𝑖𝑡, 
(3) 
Where, MM_Disclose is a variable equal to 1 if the firms disclose its key industry-
specific marketing metric and 0 otherwise. We estimate the IMR as 𝜆𝑖𝑡 =
𝜙(∆′̂𝑍𝑖𝑡)
𝛷(∆′̂𝑍𝑖𝑡)
 and include it 
in the main model (Equation 5) account for the selection bias. 
Addressing endogeneity 
Managers may strategically manage their earnings for several reasons including stock 
compensation (Guidry et al. 1999), to improve valuations around seasoned equity offerings 
(Kothari et al. 2015). Similarly, marketing managers have incentives to manage their marketing 
metric performances to get higher incentives, which is also evident from our sample that has an 
overall positive marketing metric surprise of 3.6%. Recognizing that firms may strategically 
choose to beat analyst expectations on marketing metrics would raise concerns of endogeneity of 
marketing metric surprise and we correct for the same using control function approach (Petrin 
and Train 2010). The first step is to estimate an auxiliary regression where we estimate the 
likelihood of marketing metric surprise, the endogenous variables, using exogenous variables -- 
strategic emphasis, unexpected marketing expenditure, discretionary accruals, marketing myopia, 
market value, market to book ratio, eps, eps surprise, sales, and sales surprise and use the 
residuals (𝜇𝑖?̂?) in the main model (Equation 4). 
Furthermore, in line with the exclusion restriction of the control function approach 
(Petrin and Train 2010), we include lagged industry average (peer) marketing metric surprises. 
Consistent with the institutional isomorphism theory (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), managers 
imitate their peers in the case of uncertainty around the decision whether to surprise the 
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marketing metrics or not. This is also in line with theories of and industry mindsets (Phillips 
1994) and  neo institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan 1977) that managers mimic their peers 
and gain legitimacy to counter environmental pressure. Furthermore, lagged industry average 
marketing metric surprises (lagPeerMMSUR) would not affect the cumulative abnormal returns 
of the focal firm in the current earnings season. This is mainly due to industry being a large 
enough entity to affect one firm’s returns and there is a time lag in the effect, which according to 
the efficient market hypothesis should affect returns in the lagged quarter and not the present 
quarter (Fama 1970). Therefore, lagPeerMMSUR serve as valid instrument i.e., although it is 
correlated with the endogenous variable marketing metric surprise (relevance), it is not 
correlated with the error and does not directly affect the dependent variable (exogeneity). We 
present the empirical support of these claims in the results section. Formally, we write the second 
auxiliary regression model as: 
 𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡, (4) 
 
Next, we specify a random-effects model regression that accounts for unobserved 
heterogeneity and augment the model to correct for sample selection bias and potential 
endogeneity correction. Finally, we account for industry fixed effects to account for observed 
heterogeneity and time fixed effects to account for any seasonal changes. 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3∆𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 × 𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑡) +
 𝛽5(𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 × ∆𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽6𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽8∆𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 +




where; i is the firm, t is year-quarter time, MMSUR is marketing metric surprise, SE is strategic 
emphasis, ∆𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝 is unexpected change in marketing expenditure, EPSSUR is the earnings 
per share surprise, SALESSUR is sales surprise, ∆𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is stock recommendation, 
NUMEST is the number of analyst estimates or analyst coverage, EPS is the baseline earnings 
per share, MM is the baseline marketing metric output, AT is total assets, MV is market value, 
Sales is total sales, and HHI is competitive intensity. Since we use the estimated values of IMR 
and residuals from the endogeneity correction term, we use bootstrapped standard errors.  
Time Varying-Effect Model 
 
To test hypothesis H4, we model the time-varying effect of marketing and earnings 
surprises explaining stock returns. Many marketing studies have utilized time-varying effect 
model to understand the changing role of marketing actions such as marketing expenditure 
(Osinga et al. 2010), social media marketing (Kumar et al. 2017), and marketing resource 
allocations (Saboo et al. 2016). We model the time-varying effect model as: 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0(𝑡𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽1(𝑡𝑖𝑗)𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 + 𝑖𝑗;    i=1,….,n, j=1,….,ki (6) 
where, CARij is the cumulative stock returns and Xij are earnings and marketing metric surprises 
for firm i in quarter tij, n is the total number of firms, ki is the number of repeated observations 
for firm i, tij is the measurement time for ith firm’s j
th observation, and 𝑖𝑗 is the random error 
term which is normally distributed. 𝛽1(𝑡𝑖𝑗) represents the time-varying effect of the surprises 
(earnings and marketing metric surprises).  
 To estimate the time-varying effect model, we use a semiparametric regression estimation 
with smoothing splines approach to recover the parameter𝛽1(𝑡𝑖𝑗). Specifically, we use cubic 
penalized-spline (P-spline) that has advantages over other smoothing methods in terms of 
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flexibility, computational efficiency, and it does not show boundary effects and has been used 
widely in the various studies in marketing (Saboo et al. 2016; Sloot et al. 2006). Further, we need 
to specify number of knots or truncated points between time intervals used in the smoothing 
method. Although P-spline method is not sensitive to selection of number of knots, we use 
guidance by Wand (2003) and select 10 knots as the minimum number of 35 and (40/4=10), 
where 40 is the number of time-periods (quarters) in our data.  
Industry-Specific Effects Model 
 
 To answer our research question about the relative impact of earnings surprise vs 
marketing metric surprise across various industries, we estimate our main model (Equation 6) 
using hierarchical Bayesian multivariate regression to recover industry-specific parameters. In 
other words, instead of recovering average parameters (β) across industries, we recover industry-
specific parameters (𝛽𝑗), where j represents industries.
4 Specifically, we use hierarchical 
specification for𝛽𝑗, such that 𝛽𝑗~𝑀𝑉𝑁(?̅?, 𝛺) where MVN is multivariate normal distribution. In 
this way, we can estimate industry-level coefficients and at the same time consider overall 
average effects, ?̅?. Further, we draw the industry average parameters using a multivariate 
specification?̅?~𝑀𝑉𝑁(?̿?, 0). For all the parameters, we assume vague conjugate priors. For the 
estimation, we use two MCMC chains with 50,000 draws where we use 40,000 for burn-in 
period and remaining 10,000 for estimating posterior means. 
 
 
4 Since there are different marketing metrics in different industries and an increase in marketing metric surprise in 
one industry-specific marketing metric may be assessed differently than other industry. Therefore, for relative 
information content across industries, we operationalize marketing metric surprises as dummy variable where 1 
indicates non-negative surprises and 0 indicates negative surprise. Similarly, we use dummy variable 




Auxiliary Estimation Results 
In Table 4, we present first stage probit model results where we find that our exclusion 
variables market orientation ( = 65.15, p<0.01) and disclosure prevalence ( = 5.04, p<0.01) are 
significant predictors of a firm’s decision to disclose its marketing metrics at the time of earnings 
announcement. Both the market orientation nature and disclosure prevalence in the industry 
increase the voluntary disclosure of marketing metrics of a focal firm. The inclusion of market 
orientation and disclosure prevalence variables improve the hit-rate by 12.1% giving confidence 
in the relevancy of these instruments. Further, we find that our control variables that explain the 
disclosure are along the expected lines. Specifically, we find that ownership concentration 
decreases ( = -0.995, p<0.05) marketing metrics disclosures as there is a higher potential for 
agency conflicts when ownership is in fewer hands (Fama and Jensen 1983), whereas higher 
marketing intensity ( = 1.145, p<0.01) improves such a disclosure as managers attempt to 
reduce information asymmetry. Similarly, we observe that a higher analyst coverage ( = 0.032, 
p<0.01) and higher percentage of shares held by institutional shareholders ( = 0.0004, p<0.1) 
increase voluntary disclosure of marketing metrics as these firms are highly monitored by 
analysts and have a higher reputation. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Next, as discussed earlier in the second auxiliary equation, we test exclusion restriction of 
instruments empirically by assessing correlations between the instrument and the endogenous 
and dependent variable of our main model. We find that the correlation between lagPeerMMSUR 
and the focal firm’s marketing metric surprise is positive (ρ = 0.31) and with CAR is negligible 
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(ρ = 0.008). These results provide additional confidence to our theoretical arguments that the 
instrument, lagged industry average marketing metric surprises, is a valid instrument for the 
endogeneity correction model. 
Main-model Estimation Results   
We present the results of main model in Table 4. First, we find that the coefficient of 
IMR ( = .002, p<0.1) and the endogeneity correction term of marketing metric surprise ( = 
.015, p<0.05) are both significant suggesting that our assumptions of these modeling challenges 
are genuine, and we corrected for the same. Next, in line with hypothesis H1, our results indicate 
that marketing metrics surprise has a positive effect on 3-days CAR at the time of earnings 
announcement.5 This result suggests that there is an information content in the marketing metric 
surprises and investors react positively to increase in such surprises hoping that there will be a 
higher future cash flow from these marketing metric surprises. Consistent with the existing 
literature (Bartov et al. 2002; Easton and Harris 1991), an increase in eps surprise affects CAR 
positively ( = .015, p<0.01). It is important to note that that the impact of eps surprise is 
significantly higher than marketing metric surprise. The Wald test confirms that the effect of 
earnings surprise on stock returns is significantly higher than the marketing metric surprise 
(𝜒2(1) = 14.3, p<0.01). We also find that there are positive synergistic effects of marketing 
metric and eps surprises ( = .012, p<0.01). In other words, firms that have higher than expected 




5 Our results are consistent with other event windows: 1-day (0, 1], and 2-days [0, 1].  
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Next, we discuss the results of our moderating effects of firm’s resource allocation 
signals and investors’ screening cues. First, regarding the moderating hypothesis H2 of a firm’s 
strategic emphasis on value appropriation relative to value creation (resource allocation signals), 
where we theoretically argue that the moderating effect may be positive or negative. However, 
we empirically find that there is a positive moderating effect ( = .484, p<0.01) of strategic 
emphasis on relationship between marketing metric surprise on stock returns. This result 
indicates that firms that the cash flow generated from marketing metric surprises are stabilized in 
future when firms’ relative strategic emphasis is on appropriating higher values as compared to 
creating higher values. The result is similar to findings from prior literature on strategic emphasis 
(Mizik and Jacobson 2003) that suggests firms having a higher than expected earnings surprise 
are able to get higher stock returns by focusing on value appropriation activities. Our findings 
extend these results to marketing metric surprises as well.  
Further, in line with moderating hypothesis of investor’s screening of unexpected 
marketing expense (H3), we find that the effect of marketing metric surprises on stock returns 
decreases with investors’ screening of increase in unexpected marketing expenditure ( = -.109, 
p<0.01). This result indicates that a higher unexpected marketing expenditure lowers investors’ 
information uncertainty about lower marketing capabilities of firms in stabilizing future cash 
flow that is generated from an increase in marketing metric surprises. This result is in line with 
existing studies in marketing that an unexpected increase in marketing expenditure such as 
salesforce expense results in lower stock returns (Kim and McAlister 2011).  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 




 To test the hypothesis on time-varying parameters of earnings and marketing metric 
surprises (H4), we present the TVEM model results in Figure 3. Our results capture temporal 
variations in the stock returns to both earnings and marketing metric surprises. Specifically, the 
results highlight that although the effect of earnings surprise is positive throughout it diminishes 
over time. At the beginning of our study timeframe the parameter value of earnings surprise was 
closer to  = .02 and towards the end the parameter approaches closer to  = .01. It is important 
to note that the average parameter estimate of earnings surprise is  = .015 (Figure 3) is closer to 
middle of these two numbers.  
On the other hand, the effect of marketing metric surprise is close to  = .0001 in the 
beginning and towards the end it almost approaches  = .01. Also, it is important to know that 
the average parameter estimate  = .004 (Table 5), is closer to the middle value of these two 
extremes. These findings are consistent with our arguments that the effect of earnings surprises is 
decreasing over time as firms as firms spend significant resources in building their intangible 
effects that are being captured over time through marketing metric surprises.  
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
Industry-specific results 
 Finally, our industry-specific coefficients indicate that across different industries, the 
effect of marketing metric surprise is positive (the posterior mean estimates are positive does not 
contain zero) except for the education industry. In Figure 4, we present industry-specific 
coefficients for both marketing metric surprise and earnings surprise for different industries. In 
half of the industries in our analysis, the effect of marketing metric surprise is not significantly 
different than or higher than earnings surprise. Specifically, for the media and telecom industry 
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where the effect of marketing metric (number of subscribers) surprise is significantly higher 
compared to earnings surprise (the 95% confidence interval is [0.013, 0.045] and does not 
contain zero). On the other hand, the 95% confidence interval of posterior mean ( = .006) of 
earnings surprise in telecom and media industry is [0.002, 0.019]. The Wald test of the difference 
in parameters of marketing metric and earnings surprise of telecom industry corroborates that the 
difference in the posterior mean has 95% confidence [0.01, 0.048] and does not contain 0. This is 
mainly due to the reason that the number of subscribers is an indicator of a higher future cash 
flow as compared to the earnings surprise. These findings are also consistent with the literature 
that has used number of subscribers as key metric to measure customer based valuation of firms 
(Gupta et al. 2004; McCarthy et al. 2017).  
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
Discussions 
Propensity score matching analysis  
 Although several event studies are causal in nature (Srinivasan and Hanssens 2009), the 
effect of any surprises for event studies around earnings announcements may be contaminated 
due to multiple announcements in the same time frame. Therefore, to establish the effect of 
marketing metric surprises and disentangle the effects of other announcements, we follow a 
propensity score matching analysis (Sorescu et al. 2017). We use the dummy variable of 
marketing metric surprise as the treatment variable where 1 indicates if the firms have been 
treated with non-negative marketing metric surprise and 0 indicates negative marketing metric 
surprise or no treatment. We use different matching criteria such as nearest neighbor matching, 
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radius marching, kernel matching, and stratification matching and estimate the average treatment 
effect (ATE) of marketing metric surprise (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008).  
We find that the ATE across different analysis are in line with our main findings. 
Specifically, we find that the range of ATE of marketing metric surprise from our analysis based 
on different matching methods are in the range [0.003, 0.006]. Further, all these ATEs are 
significant at 95%. The analysis offers additional confidence in our previous results that 
marketing metric surprise has a positive effect on the stock returns at the time of earnings 
announcement beyond the effects of other confounding factors.   
Robustness 
Alternate model specification. We estimate the alternate model specification and compare the 
results with our proposed models on Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). We find that our 
proposed model (AIC = -15268) performs better than a model without our focal variable 
marketing metric surprise (AIC = -15259), without correction for sample selection bias (AIC = -
15265), and endogeneity correction (AIC = -15261). 
Alternate variable operationalization. We measure our focal independent variable, marketing 
metric surprises, in alternate ways and check for consistency of our results. First, we measure 
marketing metric surprises as the dummy variable where 1 represents the positive marketing 
metric surprise and 0 represents the negative or no marketing metric surprises. We estimate 
Equation 5 with the dummy variable and find that the marketing metric surprise positively 
affects the stock market returns ( = .014, p<0.01). Next, we measure marketing metric surprises 
using autoregressive model (Mizik 2010) and measure marketing metric surprises as the 
difference between actual marketing metric and that predicted from the model (instead of 
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consensus analysts’ estimates). We find that our results are in line with the earlier results and 
there is a positive effect of marketing metric surprises.     
Contributions 
Theoretical Contributions 
 The marketing-finance interface has been touted for the role of marketing actions and 
outcomes in increasing shareholder value. Prior studies in marketing focus on both marketing 
actions such as advertising expense, salesforce expense as well as marketing outcomes such as 
customer satisfaction, customer equity, and establishes that these marketing efforts are important 
in improving shareholder value. However, the stock market mainly focuses on marketing 
outcomes that are value relevant to investors. Therefore, to understand the effect of such 
marketing metrics and in order to accurately capture the role of marketing in explaining stock 
returns, we also contrast it with the most important financial metric that stock market considers 
(i.e., earnings surprise) in assessing a firm’s value. This is the first study to introduce the concept 
of marketing metric surprise in assessing a firm’s stock returns. We compile industry-specific 
marketing metrics that are value relevant to the stock market for each industry in our study.  
The study contributes mainly to the literature marketing-finance interface by introducing 
and signifying the concept of marketing metric surprises at quarterly earnings announcements. 
We argue that marketing metric surprises are an indicator of higher future cash flow and 
therefore investors react to higher marketing metric surprises. Specifically, we contribute to the 
literature on information economics indicating that marketing metric surprise has an information 
and that good news (higher marketing metric surprises) results in higher stock returns. The study 
also sheds light on the information asymmetry literature suggesting that the information content 
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in marketing metric surprise increases with strategic emphasis on value appropriation activates 
relative to value creation activities. Further, the study also adds to the resource-based view of 
firms that firms with a higher marketing capability i.e., those using a higher than expected 
marketing expenditure would get lower returns from their marketing metric surprises. We argue 
that the future cash flows generated by marketing metric surprises can be stabilized by signaling 
(of strategic emphasis) and screening (of unanticipated marketing expenditure) mechanisms by 
firms. 
 Finally, our study also contributes to the literature on market-based assets (Srivastava et 
al. 1998) where we investigate temporal variations in the effects of marketing metric surprises 
and industry-specific effects (relative information content of marketing metric surprises). We 
argue that firms are increasingly spending resources in building their intangible assets and that 
investors learn about this mechanism through information content in marketing metric surprises. 
Therefore, we observe an increasing effect of marketing metric surprises affecting stock returns 
of firms over time whereas the effect of earnings surprise decreases over time. Finally, our 
results highlight that in half of the industries, the effect of marketing metric surprises is not 
different than the effect of earnings surprise. Specifically, industries with higher intangible assets 
(e.g., telecommunication and media firms) have significantly higher returns to marketing metric 
surprises as compared to earnings surprises. 
Managerial Contributions 
 The study is a substantial step towards marketing accountability in the firm specially 
related to quarterly earnings. During the earnings call and earnings report, the role of marketing 
has been almost nonexistent. This study would be the first to bring marketing managers and their 
role to the forefront. Managers should not only focus on disclosing key marketing metrics but 
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also aim to surprise the stock market with respect to these metrics so that the surprise will have 
higher stock returns. Specifically, we find that a 1% increase in marketing metric surprise would 
increase the cumulative abnormal return by $ 3.6 Million at the time of earnings announcement. 
These calculations are based on the total shares traded around earnings announcement and the 
average share price. In the media and telecom industry where marketing metrics surprises are 
superior to earnings surprises, a positive surprise in the number of subscribers increases the 
returns by $ 11.8 Million. 
 Finally, our findings also highlight the increasing importance of marketing metric 
surprises over time. The study attempts to divert both investors and managers’ attention from 
traditional earnings surprises to marketing metric surprises by highlighting the increasing 
importance of marketing metric surprise whereas decreasing effect of earnings surprises. 
Specifically, we show that the effect of earnings surprises on stock returns declines by almost 
half (0.021 to 0.01) during the timeframe of our study (2007 to 2017). On the other hand, during 
the same timeframe, the effect of marketing metric surprises affecting stock returns increases 
significantly.  
Conclusion 
 In this study, we attempt to assess the impact of firms’ performance on marketing metrics 
that exceeds consensus analysts’ expectations on marketing metrics i.e., marketing metric 
surprises on the stock market returns. Our findings suggest that marketing metric surprises act as 
good news to investors. However, its impact on the stock returns is contingent upon the firm’s 
marketing resource allocation signals and investors screening cues of unanticipated marketing 
expenditures. Further, the study highlights the increasing time-varying effects of marketing 
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metric surprises whereas decreasing effects of earnings surprises. Finally, the study compares the 
relative information content of marketing metric surprises compared to earnings surprises across 
various industries. We find that for the telecommunication and media industry marketing metric 
surprises are superior to earnings surprises in explaining stock returns. The findings of our study 
are significant to marketing managers who can efficiently utilize resources to beat the market 
expectations. Marketing executives can also benefit from our findings in establishing the 
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Table 3: Variable Operationalization and Data source of Key Variables 









Percentage difference in marketing metrics relative to 
consensus analyst estimates of marketing metrics 
Factset 
Strategic emphasis 
Ratio of difference between value appropriation 
(advertising expense) and value creation (R&D 




Difference between actual and expected marketing 
expense estimated through autoregressive model 
Compustat 
Earnings surprise 
Percentage difference in earnings per share relative to 
consensus analyst estimates of earnings per share 
Factset 
Sales surprise 
Percentage difference in sales relative to consensus 
analyst estimates of sales 
Factset 
Recommendation 
Difference between current stock recommendation and 
past stock recommendations estimated through 
autoregressive model 
IBES 
EPS Actual earnings per share value (baseline) Factset 
Marketing metric Actual marketing metric value (baseline) Factset 
Analyst coverage Total number of analysts providing forecasts Factset 
Assets total assets of the firm Compustat 
Market Value 
Number of outstanding shares multiplied by share price 
at closing  
CRSP 
Sales total sales of the firm Compustat 
Competitive intensity 
Herfindahl-index measured as sum of squared sales of 







Table 4: Parameter estimates for the Heckman Correction model (Equation 3) 















Market Value 0.0007 0.000 
Market to Book Ratio 0.0004 0.001 
Assets 0.0003 0.000 
Intercept 0.0162 0.021 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes 
Notes: ***p < .01 (two-tailed) 
             **p < .05 (two-tailed) 




Table 5: Parameter estimates for the model of marketing metric surprise affecting stock 








Marketing Metric Surprise (MMSUR) 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.004** 
EPS Surprise (EPSSUR)  0.014*** 0.015*** 
MMSUR × EPSSUR   0.012*** 
Strategic Emphasis (SE)   -0.067 
MMSUR × SE   0.484*** 
Unanticipated Marketing Expense (∆𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝)   0.001 
MMSUR × ∆𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝   -0.109*** 
SALESSUR   0.013*** 
Recommendation (∆𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)   0.002 
Analyst Coverage (NUMEST)   -0.004 
EPS   0.001*** 
Marketing Metric (MM)   -0.001 
Assets (AT)   -0.002 
Market Value (MV)   -0.04 
Sales   0.309* 
Competitive Intensity (HHI)   0.003 
IMR (𝜗𝑖?̂?)   0.002
* 
Endogeneity Correction Term (𝜇𝑖?̂?)   0.015
** 
Intercept 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.026 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
Year-Quarter Fixed Effects Yes 
Notes: ***p < .01 (two-tailed) 
            **p < .05 (two-tailed) 






















Figure 2: (A) Time-series plot of earnings and marketing metric surprise and (B) model free 
evidence of relationship between marketing metric surprise and abnormal stock return 

























(A) Time Series plot of EPS and Marketing Metric Surprise


































(B) Model Free Evidence
Number of Firms Abnormal Returns for Positive MM Surprise
Abnormal Returns for Negative MM Surprise
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Figure 3: Industry-specific coefficient curve and 95% confidence band of marketing metric 














































































































Effect of Marketing Metric and EPS Surprise on Stock Returns





Table A1: List of words used to measure Market Orientation of firms 
Customer Oriented Competition Oriented 
customer base compet* 
Customers lost peer* 
consumer* position* 
customer* barrier entry 
customer acqui* market 
customer retention* marketplace 
engage* competitive advantage 
customer base strateg* 










maintain customer relation 
subscrib*  
customer Profitability 
word of mouth 
customer equity 
customer loyalty 
 
